what it means to be British, which stems from such changes as globalisation, multiculturalism and the erosion of traditional social ties -all of which have placed long standing loyalties and attachments under strain (Gamble and Wright, 2007, p. 5) .
Contemporary politicians have responded to these anxieties by articulating their visions of Britain and Britishness, through which they seek to unite the citizenry around a set of shared ideals and a common identity. The salience of the so-called 'British Question' is equally evident in a growing body of academic literature, which explores issues ranging from the future of the Union (e.g. Hazell, 2007 ) to Britain's troubled relationship not only with its imperial past (e.g. Marquand, 2007; Mycock, 2010) , but also with Europe (e.g. Gifford, 2010) . Other scholars, meanwhile, have analysed Gordon Brown's conception of Britishness, paying particular attention to his definition of, and rationale for, the 'British Way' (Lee, 2006) and to its relationship to his wider political philosophy (Hassan, 2007) . While these contributions recognise the role of narrative and myth in conceptualising Britain and British identity, the rhetoric of Britishness remains under-theorised. This omission is important because a rhetorical analysis can shed valuable light on how political actors use these tools to construct and promote a particular vision of Britain, the relation between such conceptions and party ideology, and why some articulations of 'the nation' gain traction with the public whereas others do not. The present article begins to address this oversight, and so will make a contribution to scholarship on both Britishness and British political speech (e.g. Atkins, 2011; Atkins and Finlayson, 2014; Finlayson, 2014; Martin, 2015) .
The article begins with an overview of the rhetorical techniques that may be employed to construct a collective self-image and reinforce a shared identity. Here, it pays particular attention to cultural symbols and political myths, the latter of which may be activated through metaphor. Taking Gordon Brown and David Cameron as case studies, the article then examines the ways in which their rhetoric of Britishness appeals to a mythologised historical event, namely Magna Carta. This analysis reveals that although both leaders link the Great Charter to the myth of British exceptionalism, Brown advances an inward-looking account whereas Cameron defines Britishness against the European 'Other'. Finally, the article argues that Magna Carta functions as a 'founding myth', as the purported origin of core British values and institutions, and that its emergence as such is indicative of a change in Britain's 'rhetorical culture'. It concludes by reflecting on the utility of the myth of Magna Carta in contemporary political communication.
I. Rhetoric, myth and community
Aristotle identifies three genres of rhetoric -deliberative, forensic and epideictic -which, respectively, are concerned with persuading or deterring an audience from a specified course of action, prosecution or defence, and praise or blame (2004, p. 80) . 1 For our purposes the most important of these is epideictic rhetoric, as its use can
Increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with them (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 51 ).
This amplification of shared values and identity creates a sense of belonging in an audience, and so unites them in the pursuit of a common goal. It is therefore unsurprising that epideictic rhetoric features heavily in set-piece political occasions, such as the leader's party conference speech in the UK and the State of the Union address in the USA. A typical example is present in Barack Obama's speech to the Democratic National Convention in 2004, where he told his audience that: 'We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America'. By using the pronouns 'we' and 'us', Obama sought to bring himself and his audience together, while the appeal to shared cultural symbols reinforced identification with the national political community.
As James Jasinski observes, epideictic rhetoric also permits a speaker to 'create an identity for [their] community through a process of exclusion ' (2001, p. 213) . This is achieved by extolling the virtues of 'our' community, while setting 'us' against an 'enemy' who does not share our values or world-view. In Murray Edelman's words:
Enemies are characterised by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course of action they pursue … and even if they take no political action at all (1988, p. 67).
We find an example of this rhetoric of division in Ronald Reagan's speech at a meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. Here, he constituted the United
States as a nation built on the principles of 'freedom and personal liberty', and the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' whose policy of state atheism had imprisoned its people in a 'totalitarian darkness ' (1983) . Reagan thus established a sense of communion in his listeners by reaffirming America's self-understanding as a 'righteous people' (Jasinski, 2001, p. 212) in opposition to the Soviet 'Other' whose values were antithetical to their own.
Similarly, Reinhold Niebuhr contends that each nation develops a 'social myth', through which it 'defends itself and justifies its interests' while undermining the moral credibility of its enemies. To this end, historical events are framed in a way that portrays the nation in a favourable light, thereby constructing a collective self-image that underpins claims to national superiority on the world stage (1967, p. 40) . These myths also contribute to a shared sense of belonging among the citizenry. In Michael C. McGee's words, 'so long as "the people" believe basic myths, there is unity and collective identity ' (1975, p. 245) . It is important to recognise that several competing myths will be present within a society, on the ground that each generation of 'the people' will have its own system of myths. Consequently,
any new myth will be in competition not only with 'objective' reality, but with the alreadyexisting myths that seek to interpret this reality (McGee, 1975, pp. 245-46) .
On McGee's view, 'political myths are purely rhetorical phenomena, ontological appeals constructed from artistic proofs and intended to redefine an uncomfortable and oppressive reality ' (1975, p. 247) . A case in point is the myth of the American Dream, which originated with the Founding Fathers and promises that, through hard work, anyone can succeed in life regardless of their background. Here, individualism is fused with capitalism to unite the citizenry behind the ideals of freedom and opportunity for all. Although rendered increasingly illusory by high levels of economic and social inequality, the American Dream remains 'one of the most revered mythologies in the United States' (Beasley, 2011, p. 38) . Its outward-facing appeal is equally undiminished, and the US maintains its image as a 'New World where individuals, freed from ancient constraints, can make their fortunes according to their own spirit, determination, and belief in an American Dream' (Beasley, 2011, p. 69) .
Myths and cultural symbols play a central role in epideictic speeches about the nation and national identity. Here they form part of an argument, where they support -and indeed are supported by -appeals to the character of the speaker (ethos), the emotions of an audience (pathos) and factual evidence (logos). These three appeals can enhance the persuasive power of a speech by, for instance, demonstrating a leader's patriotism, stirring feelings of national pride, and invoking significant events from the nation's history. Also important is metaphor, through which political actors may incite an emotional response in hearers and activate political myths. As Jonathan Charteris-Black explains, ideology 'appeals through consciously formed sets of beliefs, attitudes and values while myth appeals to our emotions… through unconsciously formed sets of beliefs, attitudes and values ' (2005, p. 13, emphasis in original) .
The role of metaphor is to mediate between these cognitive and emotional modes of persuasion, and thus to generate a moral viewpoint on life. In addition, it can help a social group to use a particular belief system to create the meanings through which it can justify its own existence to itself, and so promote cohesion.
Having outlined the rhetorical techniques that may be used to affirm a common national identity, the article now turns to the language of Britishness. (Lee, 2006, p. 374 ; see also Hassan, 2009, pp. 92-93; Marquand, 2007, pp. 18-19) . Meanwhile, the analysis of Cameron draws on four texts Brown conveys the importance of Magna Carta through textile metaphors. Thus, the Great
Charter is depicted as the knot that anchors this 'golden thread' of liberty, which shines out unbroken through 800 years of British history and whose preciousness is conveyed through the conceptual metaphor GOLD IS A TREASURE. 2 The textile metaphor, meanwhile, evokes the collectivist notion of the 'social fabric', the idea that human beings are interdependent. These themes recur in Brown's account of Britishness, and indeed he employs another textile metaphor to describe the values of the British Way as 'not only the ties that bind us, but also give us patriotic purpose as a nation and a sense of direction and destiny ' (2006) . At one level, it seems Brown is primarily addressing his immediate audience -the Fabian New Year Conference -on the ground that the interdependence he praises is a core tenet of social democratic ideology. However, his acclaim for 'shared civic values' (2006) gives his words wider appeal and is intended to create a sense of communion among his listeners. This effect is amplified by the pronoun 'us', which links members of the national audience both to Brown and to each other while uniting them in a shared future.
Hence Magna Carta is mythologised as the foundation of liberty, a value which, on Brown's view, lies at the very heart of the British people's collective identity.
In a 4 . These are strong statements and they tap into the deeply held belief that Britain is an exceptional -perhaps even providential -nation (Marquand, 2007, p. 16 ). This myth of Britain's inherent superiority masks the uncomfortable reality that its global influence has declined since 1945, and it is noteworthy that Brown harks back to past glories (as opposed to present day achievements) in his efforts to sustain it. Indeed, Brown invokes this notion of uniqueness to establish communion with his audience, telling them that 'Now is the time to reaffirm our distinctive British story of liberty -to show it is as rich, powerful and relevant to the life of the nation today as ever ' (2007b) .
Despite this diminishing international prestige, the Labour Party has maintained a belief in Britain's capacity to provide moral leadership to the world (Vickers, 2004) After all, he claims, it is these 'enduring ideals which shape our view of ourselves and our communities', and in turn 'influence the way our institutions evolve ' (2006) . However, in marginalising institutions, as well as our common interests and shared experience, Brown's account of Britishness is rendered strangely abstract (Hazell, 2007, p. 105 (Crick, 2007, p. 152) , while England 'seems forever silenced and forbidden to speak in its own collective national voice' (Hassan, 2007, p. 94) . Given the 2011 census revealed that a majority of people in England, Scotland and Wales identify solely as English (60%), Scottish (62%) or Welsh (58%) (Easton, 2013 ), Brown's failure to incorporate elements from -and so give due recognition to -these distinct national identities reduced the likelihood that his vision of an overarching 'British Way' would achieve widespread acceptance. It is striking that the European Union is similarly marginalised, and it may be the case that these oversights reflect Britain's self-image as an exceptional nation, along with its 'island mentality'. This interpretation recalls Brown's representation of Britain as a lone, heroic leader -as opposed to a partner -in his narrative of British history. It also ensures that
Brown's account of Britishness is rendered a 'strangely insular creation which tries to ignore that national identity is never just about internal characteristics and relationships, but external relationships as well' (Hassan, 2007, p. 95 ; see also Mycock, 2010) . By contrast, and as we will see next, Cameron's vision of Britishness is more outward-facing and, specifically, is defined against the European 'Other'.
III. David Cameron: Magna Carta, human rights and British exceptionalism
Like Brown, Cameron situates Magna Carta within a narrative of British history, but he identifies it instead as the source of human rights. He explains that:
In the 13 th century, Magna Carta set down specific rights for citizens, including the right to freedom from unlawful detention. In the 17 th century, the Petition of Right gave new authority to Parliament; and the Bill of Rights set limits on the power of the monarchy (2012).
This narrative then encompasses the abolition of slavery, the two World Wars, and Cameron to display his ideological credentials to the party faithful (see Atkins and Finlayson, 2014, p. 11) . He can thus demonstrate his fitness to represent his party, while the pronoun 'our' puts him in communion with a wider, non-partisan audience.
According to and free press', while the rule of law is connected to the courts and tolerance to churches and faith groups. These institutions, he continues, 'help to enforce our values, keep them in check and make sure they apply to everyone equally'. And it is this blend of values, history and institutions that, for Cameron, 'forms the bedrock of Britishness' (2014a). By incorporating these three factors into his account, Cameron offers a conception of Britishness that is 'thicker' and more culturally and historically specific than that espoused by Brown. Indeed, his invocation of the ways in which 'Britishness is represented and how it is felt in our everyday lives' (Hazell, 2007, p. 105 ) is more likely to resonate with a public audience, and so to achieve wider acceptance.
On Cameron's view, the relevance of Magna Carta extends far beyond Britain, as the principle of fundamental human rights guides his government's approach to global issues.
Using logos he explains that:
When the Arab Spring erupted, the UK was a principal supporter of resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council. We are leading EU partners in maintaining pressure on Syria. We have played a key role in securing EU sanctions against Iran (2012).
Here, Cameron offers proof of Britain's high moral standards and international importance to members of the Council of Europe. He then presents its actions as consistent with he points out that, in addition to being a defender of freedom, Britain 'gave so much of the world the way of life that they hold so dear' -notably parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and a free press (2014a). Given his stated concern for human rights, it is somewhat surprising that Cameron fuses the myths of Magna Carta and Britain's exceptionalism in his argument for the repeal of the Human Rights Act. As he told his party conference in 2014:
This is the country that wrote Magna Carta. The country that time and again has stood up for human rights, whether liberating Europe from fascism or leading the charge today against sexual violence in war. Let me put this very clearly: We do not require instruction on this from judges in Strasbourg (2014b).
For his supporters, Cameron's position can be interpreted as a challenge to arbitrary power, and hence as consistent with the spirit of Magna Carta. However, it can also be construed as an attempt to define British identity in opposition to the European Union, as we will see next.
The Conservative Party has a longstanding commitment to the ideals of sovereignty and national self-determination. From this starting point, it has constructed a narrative in which European integration is presented as a 'chronic threat to national identity and has been entered into by political elites without the consent of the British people' (Gifford, 2010, p. 332) . Underpinning this narrative is the myth of British exceptionalism, according to which:
We are oceanic and freedom-loving. They are landlocked, and torn between anarchy and despotism. We belong to the world-wide family of English-speaking peoples and therefore enjoy a special relationship with the United States. They are incorrigibly inward-looking. Above all, we are moral, while they are cynical (Marquand, 2007, p. 16, emphasis in original).
These antagonisms enable Conservative Eurosceptics to claim they are standing up for Britishness and for the 'popular sovereignty of the British people' (Gifford, 2010, p. 332) against an 'alien', unaccountable and arbitrary power. Indeed, the divisive rhetoric of 'us' and 'them' is implicit in Cameron's 2014 conference speech, where he invokes the myth of Magna Carta to reaffirm Britain's self-understanding as a strong, principled leader in contrast with a European 'Other' that lacks these exceptional qualities. This in turn amplifies sentiments of national pride and belonging, and so unites his listeners against a common adversary.
As Celeste Michelle Condit observes, 'it is through "appraisal" of the events, persons, and objects in our lives that we define ourselves. We constitute ourselves as good (necessarily) by ranging ourselves against "the bad" ' (1985, p. 291) . Such appraisals may involve misrepresentation, and hence are not always grounded in fact. This is certainly true of Cameron's depiction of Europe's human rights regime as somehow 'alien' (c.f. 'judges from Strasbourg'), which airbrushes out Britain's central role in establishing the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 (Atkins, 2011, p. 118) . Interestingly it also conflicts with his earlier praise for Churchill's commitment to the enshrinement of human rights in law. While this tension may be attributable to a desire to appeal to different audiences -the Conservative Party conference and the Council of Europe respectively -Cameron's 'Othering' of Europe is nonetheless a distortion of reality. In David Marquand's words, 'The truth is that British history has been part of European history since the Romans, and arguably for much longer ' (2007, p. 16) . By ignoring this common heritage and failing to consolidate 'a degree of banal UK Europeanism', there is a risk that Cameron's efforts to promote Britishness will only reinforce public hostility towards the EU (Gifford, 2010, p. 331) ; they are unlikely to create a positive sense of 'British' identity.
IV. British politics and the myth of Magna Carta
According to Lothar Probst, founding myths have a capacity to 'create a common … identity, to give meaning to the past and the future of a polity and to promise temporal continuity instead of the contingency of human existence and life'. Consequently, they possess considerable symbolic power, which in turn shapes the consciousness and collective memory of the citizenry (2003, p. 46 It is important to note that founding myths contain elements of both fact and fiction. Despite the far-reaching legacy that has been claimed for it, Magna Carta was 'annulled by the pope within three months, on the grounds that it was enacted under duress' (Norman, 2015, p. 25) .
It also makes no mention of democracy, and in reality was a peace treaty between King John and the English nobility; its impact on ordinary people was negligible at best (Magna Carta 800 th , 2011). Nevertheless, the myths that have built up around Magna Carta, in conjunction with our temporal distance from 1215, ensure that the Charter can be imagined in a variety of ways (while remaining within the bounds of plausibility) and its complexities and ambivalences ignored. Magna Carta therefore has considerable rhetorical utility, as it can be invoked to support arguments not only about Britain and Britishness, but also about such values as liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
V. Conclusion
This article has explored the ways in which Magna Carta is mythologised and articulated in the rhetoric of Britishness. It shows that Brown and Cameron employ the Great Charter as a 'founding myth', which grounds their conceptions of British values and provides a starting point for their narratives of Britain's history and its unique role in the world. Interestingly, both figures treat England as a 'part' that stands for the 'whole', and so offer an unduly narrow vision of Britain as a political community. The article also highlights some important differences between them, notably that Brown assigns priority to values over interests and institutions, whereas Cameron appeals to a broader range of national symbols. In the international arena, meanwhile, Brown emphasises Britain's heroic leadership as a cause for national pride, while Cameron recognises that Britain may sometimes act as a partner as well as a leader. This appears to indicate that Cameron's rhetoric of Britishness is more inclusive and outward-facing than that of Brown, and hence is likely to have wider appeal. However, it is Cameron alone who defines Britain in opposition to the European 'Other'. While this approach reflects his party's deep-seated attachment to the principle of national sovereignty, it risks creating a British identity that is based more on antagonism than on a positive appraisal of Britain itself.
The emergence of Britishness as a political concern comes at a time when it is increasingly difficult to appeal to 'the nation' as a unified entity. In a culturally diverse society such as Britain, there is no single common opinion, or doxa (Atkins and Finlayson, 2014, p. 1; see also Finlayson, 2014, p. 434) , and so politicians must draw on an ever wider range of myths, values, cultural symbols and institutions in articulating their visions of Britishness. After all, an overly restrictive definition of Britishness risks being exclusionary and thus is unlikely to attract widespread support. Equally, political actors who seek to develop a new social myth must ensure sufficient continuity with existing cultural symbols if they are to maintain loyalty, while also recognising the need for flexibility. As Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright put it, Britishness is 'the product and expression of common experience, but of an experience that is forever on the move ' (2007, p. 6 ).
In contemporary arguments about Britishness, the myth of Magna Carta has considerable rhetorical utility. It is untainted by the legacy of imperialism and, as the present article demonstrates, it can be mobilised to support a range of claims and ideological positions. This opens up avenues for further research into the role played by Magna Carta in political speech.
